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Human minds often engage in thoughts and feelings that are self-generated rather
than stimulus-dependent, such as daydreaming. Recent research suggests that under
certain circumstances, daydreaming is associated with adverse effects on cognition
and affect. Based on recent literature about the influence of resting mind in relation
to rumination and depression, this questionnaire study investigated mechanisms linking
daydreaming to depressive symptoms. Specifically, an indirect effect model was tested
in which daydreaming influences depressive symptoms through enhancing self-focus
and ruminative thought. Results were in line with the hypothesis and several alternative
pathways were ruled out. The results provide initial supportive evidence that daydreaming
can influence depressive symptoms through influences on self-focus and rumination.
Further research should use prospective or experimental designs to further validate and
strengthen these conclusions.
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All the daydreams are ego-centred.[. . . ]
Each of the daydreams is like a little play, whose hero is the
dreamer himself
G. H. Green (1923, pp. 27–28)
INTRODUCTION
It often happens that one’s mind drifts away from what one is
doing or that one’s attention fluctuates inward during rest. For
instance, in everyday life it is a common experience, while read-
ing a book, not to be able to recall the last page, or during a long
train ride, to spend a large part of time being unaware of the other
passengers. In other words, there is ample evidence that human
mind often focuses on mental contents arising independently
from the direct environment or the task at hand (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; Smallwood, 2013). Consequently, this spe-
cific process has been defined “self-generated thought” (SGT;
Smallwood, 2013).
Throughout decades, SGT has been operationalized in dif-
ferent ways (Callard et al., 2013), by focusing either on its
independence from the ongoing task (i.e., stimulus-independent
thought; Mason et al., 2007) or the internal rather than
external source of information (i.e., spontaneous thought;
Christoff et al., 2011). We here choose to operationalize SGT
as “daydreaming” (Klinger, 2013), which is a comprehensive
phenomenon that, beyond (i) being based on SGT, gath-
ers all the mental states sharing crucial characteristics, such
as (ii) the same neurobiological substrate (Stawarczyk et al.,
2011), and (iii) similar subjective content (Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006). By doing so, we have multiple advantages,
such as being allowed to capitalize on previous literature
(Klinger, 1971, 1990, 2009, 2013) and the related instruments
of measurement (Singer and Antrobus, 1970, 1972; Giambra,
1980).
Daydreaming is conceived as “nonworking thought that is
either spontaneous or fanciful” (Klinger, 2009, p. 226) and it is
considered the default mode of the mind (Klinger, 1971; Mason
et al., 2007). This definition includes SGT unrelated to the task at
hand, also known as mindwandering (Smallwood and Schooler,
2006), as well as instances when themind wanders toward fanciful
topics during rest (Klinger, 1971). The value of this definition has
been confirmed recently by studies showing that daydreaming is
enrooted in a specific large-scale neurobiological network (Mason
et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009) known as the Default Mode
Network (DMN). The DMN is a neural network that is highly
active during rest and less active, if not deactivated, during intense
task engagement (Raichle et al., 2001). This network has been
associated with a list of mental functions that are characterized
by an internal focus, among which daydreaming seems to play a
major role. Mason et al. (2007) have shown that when partici-
pants’ minds drifted away from a well-practiced task, high levels
of DMN activation were observed. Interestingly, the activation
levels of DMN hub areas were correlated with a well-established
self-report measure of daydreaming, the Daydreaming Frequency
Scale (DDFS, Singer and Antrobus, 1970).
As mental baseline, daydreaming is a frequent phenomenon.
Estimates suggest that we spend 30–50% of our mental activ-
ity during waking hours in thoughts that are neither related to
what we are doing at that moment nor to the immediate sur-
rounding environment (Klinger and Cox, 1987/88; Killingsworth
and Gilbert, 2010; Franklin et al., 2013). In light of this ubiq-
uity, it would be hard to believe that SGT does not serve spe-
cific functions, be it adaptive or maladaptive (Klinger, 1996,
2013). Although rarely studied until recently, the benefits of SGT
are increasingly being reported in regard to different domains
(Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013), for instance creative thinking
(Baird et al., 2012), autobiographical planning (Smallwood et al.,
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2011), and delaying gratification (Smallwood et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, several costs of SGT have been documented as well.
Daydreaming, and specifically the mindwandering subtype, has
been shown to detrimentally impact on reading comprehension
(Franklin et al., 2011), sustained attention (Smallwood et al.,
2004), and working memory (McVay and Kane, 2012).
In line with these findings, daydreaming, especially if charac-
terized by negative cognitions, has been associated with symp-
toms of psychopathology, such as depression, schizophrenia,
anxiety, and dissociation (Klinger et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna
et al., in press). What also confirms the potentially toxic role of
daydreaming is that its neurobiological substrate has been con-
sistently found to be affected in major psychopathology, such
as schizophrenia and depression (Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford,
2012).
Depression is an important context within which to investi-
gate the clinical impact of daydreaming, as this disorder involves
spending much time in inactivity, after which higher levels of
depressed mood and lower levels of mastery and pleasure are
shown (Martinsen, 2008). In line with this, many studies have
indeed reported a clear and direct relation between daydreaming
and depressive symptoms (Golding and Singer, 1983; Stawarczyk
et al., 2011; Epel et al., 2013). For instance, Giambra and Traynor
(1978) have shown that the frequency of and the tendency to
be absorbed by daydreaming, especially if negatively valenced,
correlated with three different measures of depression. Recently,
Meyer et al. (2011) confirmed this finding, reporting that the
tendency to engage in daydreaming was predicted by both the
severity of current depressive symptoms and the likelihood of
former depressive episodes. Furthermore, in a laboratory set-
ting, individuals with subclinical levels of depression exhibited
more accessible periods of mindwandering while encoding verbal
material, greater attentional control failures, and higher physi-
ological response than euthymic individuals (Smallwood et al.,
2007).
Nevertheless, other studies did not support this link between
depression and daydreaming in the same clear way, but pro-
posed a more specific relation. Deng et al. (2012) reported that
levels of depressive symptoms correlated only with the rate of
episodes of mindwandering that occurred without the partici-
pant’s awareness of being off task (e.g., l “zoned out”), but not
with those episodes of which a participant was aware (e.g., “tuned
out”). Moreover, Marchetti et al. (2012b) showed that individuals’
levels of depressive symptoms were not correlated with mind-
wandering, but the former moderated the latter in predicting
the accessibility of negative thinking. In keeping with this result,
Smallwood et al. (2004/05) also reported that the rate of being off
task correlated with individuals’ mean scores of depression, but
only in high ruminators and not in low ruminators.
This inconsistency in findings highlights the need to clarify
the mechanism(s) through which daydreaming can lead to neg-
ative outcomes. Shedding light on the underlying process could
indeed help understand what conditions increase the likelihood
of negative outcomes related to daydreaming. Recently, Marchetti
et al. (under review) proposed a comprehensive model that could
explain the depressogenic role of daydreaming via contribution
of multiple cognitive risk factors, such as rumination. In keeping
with this, Marchetti et al. (2013) demonstrated in a laboratory
setting that higher levels of internal focus during resting state pre-
dicted increased levels of state rumination that, in turn, explained
a temporary worsening in mood. This model specifically held in
individuals at-risk for depression. The authors speculated that
being internally focused during rest could facilitate the emergence
of self-related material that is the ideal condition for rumination
to occur (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Rumination, in turn, has
been consistently found to enhance depressive symptoms (Aldao
et al., 2010). Literature consistently reports that during SGT exter-
nal information is processed to a lesser extent (Smilek et al., 2010;
Barron et al., 2011), and the train of thoughts is largely insulated
(Smallwood et al., 2012). Such reduced processing of external
distractions could augment repetitive thinking (Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008).
In the current study, we aimed to test the indirect effect
hypothesis that: (a) during daydreaming, self-related material
would be significantly present in individuals’ awareness; (b) being
self-focused during SGT would spur ruminative processing of
the emerged material; (c) a rigid and judgmental evaluation of
internal material would lead to depressive symptoms. Given the
inconsistent findings mentioned above, we did not make any a
priori hypothesis about a direct association between daydreaming
and depressive symptoms. Our study contributes to this research
field in different ways. Importantly, by testing this model, we can
further specify the mechanisms through which daydreaming is
toxic and detrimental for mental health. Moreover, by relying on
self-report questionnaires, our study may complement previous
research that, although methodologically rigorous, suffers from
suboptimal ecological validity, such as fMRI or specific laboratory
contexts.
Therefore, we administered several trait questionnaires to
measure individual levels of daydreaming (vs. mindfulness), self-
focus, rumination, and depressive symptoms. Importantly, the
scale we adopted as a measure for spontaneous cognitions,
the DDFS, was previously used in both neurobiological and
behavioral studies that confirmed its solid relation with the
DMN (Mason et al., 2007) and rest-related phenomena, such as
mindwandering (Mrazek et al., 2012; Stawarczyk et al., 2012).
Moreover, in order to evaluate the specific role of daydreaming in
predicting depressive outcomes, we controlled for dispositional
level of mindfulness. Mindfulness has been defined in different
ways, but here we focused on the perspective that definesmindful-
ness as sustained non-distraction from here and now (Brown and
Ryan, 2003). By partialling it out, we could establish the specific
role of daydreaming above and beyond the potential confound of
mindfulness.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We recruited 117 native Dutch-speaking students at Ghent
University (mean age 21.51 ± 3.04, range: 20–46, F: 116 and
M: 11). This study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the
faculty of Psychology and Education of Ghent University.
1All the analyses reported in this study did not substantially change after
excluding the only male participant.
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DESIGN
The questionnaires were completed in a group setting. The order
of the questionnaires was counterbalanced2.
MATERIALS
Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS; Singer and Antrobus, 1970)
The DDFS is one of the scales forming the Imaginal Processes
Inventory. It consists of 12 items used to assess the frequency
of daydreaming. Respondents rate each item on a 5-point Likert
scale. Previous studies have reported good to excellent psychome-
tric properties (Singer and Antrobus, 1970). For instance, both
the English and the French version have been found to be unifac-
torial with substantial loading of each item (Singer and Antrobus,
1970; Stawarczyk et al., 2012). The instrument also has excellent
6–8 years test-retest reliability (r = 0.76) and internal consistency
(Cronbach’s α = 0.91) (Giambra, 1980). In the current study, the
original 12 items were translated from English to Dutch indepen-
dently by two native Dutch speakers with excellent knowledge of
academic English. Importantly, one of the translators was one
of the authors of this study (Ernst H. W. Koster), whereas the
other translator was not involved in this research. Discrepancies
between these two versions were discussed until a satisfactory ver-
sion was found. In this study, excellent internal consistency was
observed (Cronbach’s α = 0.91).
Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS; Grant et al., 2002)
The SRIS is a 20-item self-report questionnaire, consisting of two
independent subscales, the Self-Reflection subscale (SRIS-SR)
and the Insight subscale (SRIS-IN). The SRIS-SR scale includes
12 items and measures the tendency to self-focus, that is to think
about one’s own thoughts, actions, and feelings and evaluate
them. The SRIS-IN consists of 8 items that assess clarity of expe-
rience and self-knowledge. Each item is measured on a 6-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly
agree). The SRIS has high internal consistency and internal valid-
ity (Grant et al., 2002; Roberts and Stark, 2008). The Dutch
version of the questionnaire had good psychometric properties
(Sauter et al., 2010) and in the current sample, the SRIS-SR
and SRIS-IN showed excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s
α = 0.94 for SRIS-SR; α = 0.82 for SRIS-IN).
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003)
The RRS is a 22-item self-report questionnaire that measures
habitual tendency to ruminate and consists of items that describe
responses to depressed mood that are focused on the self, symp-
toms, or consequences of this mood. Participants rate to what
extent they usually engage in such responding using a 4-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always).
Total RRS scores and subscale scores for reflection and depressive
brooding were also calculated. The RRS has shown high reliabil-
ity and validity and has good psychometric properties (Treynor
et al., 2003). The Dutch version of the instrument also has good
2Another trait questionnaire of self-focus, the Private Self-Consciousness
Scale (PrSCS, Fenigstein et al., 1975), was also administered. The analysis did
not change substantially when the PrSCS was used. For sake of brevity, these
results were not reported.
reliability and satisfactory validity (Raes et al., 2003). Internal
consistency of the RRS and its subscales in the current study was
good (Cronbach’s α = 0.93 for the total score; α = 0.77 for the
brooding subscale; α = 0.74 for the reflection subscale).
Beck Depression Inventory 2nd Edition (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996)
The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report questionnaire, which assesses
the severity of affective, somatic and cognitive symptoms of
depressive phenomenology. Individuals rate each symptom on a
scale ranging from 0 to 3. TheDutch version of the BDI-II we used
has acceptable reliability and validity (Van der Does, 2002). In our
study, the BDI-II had excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s
α = 0.85).
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown and Ryan, 2003)
The MAAS is a self-report 15-item questionnaire. Participants
are required to rate each item on a 6-point Likert type scale,
ranging from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never). The MAAS
evaluates mindfulness as attention and awareness toward emo-
tions, thoughts, sensations, and situations. Higher scores on the
MAAS reflect higher levels of dispositional mindfulness. The
Dutch translation of theMAAS was made available by the authors
of the original instrument and in our study we found excellent
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.81).
DATA-ANALYTIC STRATEGY
We first investigated the psychometric properties of the Dutch
version of the DDFS. Initially, we checked the single item features
and internal consistency through item analysis and Cronbach’s
alpha respectively. We then carried out an Exploratory Factor
Analysis (EFA) on the Pearson’s correlation matrix by means of
Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) with oblique rotation (Oblimin)
to highlight the factorial structure of the instrument. According
to established guidelines (Zwick and Velicer, 1986), we retained
the number of factors suggested by the scree plot (Cattell, 1966;
see Figure 1), the Parallel Analysis (PA; Horn, 1965; see Figure 1),
and the Minimum Average Partial Correlation statistic (MAP;
Velicer, 1976). The analyses were carried out with IBM SPSS 19
and FACTOR 8.02 (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2006).
We then checked the descriptive statistics and Pearson’s corre-
lations among all the variables measured in this study. Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficient was computed when necessary. Data
were transformed to either obtain normally distributed vari-
ables or correct for outliers (z point > 3). No participants were
excluded.
According to our hypothesis (see Figure 2A), we first tested
whether trait daydreaming could explain higher levels of self-
focus (path a1), which in turn was expected to account for higher
levels of brooding (path a3). The final output of this serial medi-
ation model was individual levels of depressive symptoms (path
b2). We did not have a specific hypothesis regarding either the
total (path c) or the direct (path c′) effect of daydreaming with
depressive symptoms. According to Mathieu and Mathieu and
Taylor’s (2006) guidelines, if the indirect effect was found sig-
nificant, we could refer to this as an indirect effect model only if
both the total and direct effect were null. If one or both of these
two latter effects were found significant, we should speak of either
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FIGURE 1 | Scree plot showing the eigenvalues derived from both the
Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) and the Parallel Analysis (PA). PAF
eigenvalues: 6.23, 1.10, 0.85, 0.71, 0.66, 0.57, 0.47, 0.41, 0.32, 0.29, 0.22,
0.15. Random PA eigenvalues (12 variables, n = 117, 1000 replications):
1.56, 1.40, 1.28, 1.18, 1.09, 1.01, 0.93, 0.85, 0.78, 0.70, 0.62, 0.53.
FIGURE 2 | Theoretical path diagram showing the multiple serial
mediation model. (B) Path c: total effect. (A) Path c′: direct effect. Path
a1a3b2: specific indirect effect of interest.
full or partial mediation model (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). Given
that daydreaming and mindfulness are thought to represent neg-
atively related constructs, with the former capturing the tendency
of the mind to drift away and the latter the tendency to be aware
of the present moment (Deng et al., 2012; Mrazek et al., 2012), we
always included the mindfulness as a covariate in all the models
in which daydreaming was the focal predictor in order to establish
its contribution above and beyond mindfulness3.
In our study, the total effect (path c) was computed as the
regression coefficients of daydreaming and mindfulness predict-
ing depressive symptoms, while none of the intervening variables
were included in the model. According to the mediation theory
(Hayes, 2013), it was possible to decompose the total effect in
two main parts, that is the direct effect (path c′ with depressive
symptoms being regressed on daydreaming, self-focus, brooding,
and mindfulness) and the total indirect effect. The latter could,
in turn, be decomposed into three specific indirect effects where
daydreaming influenced depressive symptoms via: (i) self-focus
(path a1b1); (ii) brooding (path a2b2); self-focus and brood-
ing serially (path a1a3b2). By definition, the sum of the direct
effect and the total indirect effect equates to the total effect of
daydreaming on depressive symptoms.
To test the significance of both the total and specific indirect
effects, we adopted the bootstrapping approach (Preacher and
Hayes, 2008). Compared with the causal steps approach (Baron
and Kenny, 1986) or the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982), bootstrapping is
considered the most powerful approach, to be free from unreal-
istic assumptions (i.e., normal distribution of the indirect effect),
and to have better control on Type I error (Hayes, 2009, 2013).
In line with Preacher and Hayes’ recommendations (2008), to
test the significance of the indirect effects, we estimated 10,000
bootstrap bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals (CIs), and if
they did not contain zero they were considered significant. The
core hypothesis we tested was the model whereby daydreaming
influences depressive symptoms via self-focus and brooding seri-
ally (path a1a3b2). However, in order to rule out alternative paths
belonging to the same statistical model, we also estimated the
other specific indirect effects (Hayes, 2013), where the interven-
ing variables were introduced one at a time, that is either path
a1b1 or path a2b2. In order to clarify the direction of the indirect
effects, we also estimated each single path (e.g., a1, a2, a3, b1, and
b2) using an ordinary least squares regression. Finally, in adher-
ence with Mathieu and Taylor’s guidelines (2006), we tested both
the direct (path c′) and the total effect (path c).
Given that our study was purely cross-sectional, we tried to
rule out two other serial indirect effects that would work against
our main hypothesis. In the first alternative model, we substi-
tuted brooding with the reflection subscale of the RRS as the
second intervening variable. Although both reflection and brood-
ing are essentially forms of self-focus and self-referential thinking,
reflection is known not to lead to negative outcomes, such as
depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). We thus
expected the model, in which daydreaming influences depres-
sive symptoms via self-focus and reflection, not to be significant.
The second alternative model proposes that self-focus leads to
increased daydreaming, which in turn could explain depressive
brooding and depressive symptoms. Self-focus induction indeed
has been reported to influence the tendency of the mind to
drift away from external reality toward the inner mental world
(Smallwood et al., 2011). However, it is difficult to explain how
3All the analyses reported did not substantially change after excluding MAAS
as covariate.
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and why daydreaming, after being purged of its self-related com-
ponent, could lead to rumination. Therefore, we anticipated this
model would not be significant either.
All the analyses were carried out with IBM SPSS 19 and the
macro PROCESS 2.03 (Hayes, 2013).
RESULTS
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF THE
DAYDREAMING FREQUENCY SCALE (DDFS)
We evaluated the psychometric properties of the Dutch version of
the DDFS on the total sample. The inter-item correlation matrix
showed that all the DDFS items were positively correlated, mean
r = 0.47 (range: 0.17–0.84), as well as the mean-corrected item-
total correlation was r = 0.65 (range: 0.51–0.79). Cronbach’s
alpha revealed excellent internal consistency (α = 0.91), which
was not improved by item deletion. Before conducting the PAF
on the 12 items, we checked the assumptions through the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin criterion (KMO = 0.91) and the Bartlett’s test of
sphericity [χ2(66) = 773.28, p < 0.001], which highlighted suffi-
cient sample size and data quality (Gorsuch, 1983).
The scree plot inspection (see Figure 1), the Parallel Analysis
(PA; Figure 1), and theMinimumAverage Partial Correlation test
(MAP, average partial correlation = 0.331) strongly supported
the one-factor solution, which explained 51.93% of the variance
in the unrotated matrix. All the items loaded on the factor sub-
stantively, that is = 0.54 (range: 0.54–0.84). According to Stevens
(2002), for sample sizes of 100 subjects, only loadings greater
than.51 should be interpreted.
In sum, we confirmed that the Dutch version of the DDFS is
unifactorial and all the items significantly represent the underly-
ing factor. We thus adopted the sum of the 12 DDFS items as our
main variable in this study.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS
Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas and correlations
between the questionnaire measures are reported in Table 1.
In line with our hypothesis, daydreaming frequency was
positively correlated with self-focus measured with the self-
reflection scale (SRIS-SF). Daydreaming was also correlated with
rumination, and specifically with depressive brooding, but not
with reflection. In line with a previous study and current theoreti-
cal perspectives (Marchetti et al., 2013, under review), daydream-
ing seems to be a phenomenon during which evaluative and judg-
mental self-referential thinking occurs. This was also supported
by the negative relationship between the insight scale (SRIS-
IN) and daydreaming. Daydreaming seems not to be beneficial
with regard to the clarity of reflection and self-understanding;
on the contrary, it may impair these processes. In sum, although
daydreaming is focused on the daydreamer’s narrative self (e.g.,
action, feelings, past events, etc.), it is not associated with any
immediate beneficial outcome, rather it is the ideal condition for
detrimental ruminative self-focus to occur. Moreover, daydream-
ing was independent from depressive symptoms, whereas it was
negatively correlated with being aware at the presentmoment. It is
noteworthy that this modest negative relation between daydream-
ing andmindfulness has been reported previously in other studies
(i.e., r = −0.237; Mrazek et al., 2012). Importantly, not only does
this result confirm a previous finding (Mrazek et al., 2012), but
also it provides information about the divergent validity of the
Dutch version of the DDFS.
MEDIATION ANALYSIS
In accordance with Mathieu and Taylor’s guidelines (2006), we
first tested the significance of the main indirect effect of interest,
namely that daydreaming would explain the levels of depressive
symptoms via self-focus and brooding levels serially (path a1a3b2;
Figure 2). Table 2 shows that this three-step indirect effect was
indeed statistically significant (path a1a3b2 = 0.0014; boot 95%
CI LL = 0.0004, boot 95% CI UL= 0.0036). Moreover, all the sin-
gle paths of this effect were in the expected direction (Table 3).
Indeed, daydreaming positively predicted self-focus (path a1 =
0.036), which, in turn, positively predicted brooding (path a3 =
0.149). Finally, brooding positively predicted depressive symp-
toms (path b2 = 0.249). It is noteworthy that the simpler alter-
native indirect paths were both not significant. The indirect effect
whereby daydreaming influences depressive symptoms only via
self-focus failed to reach statistical significance (path a1b1 =
0.0005; boot 95% CI LL = −0.0012, boot 95% CI UL = 0.0029).
Table 1 | Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alpha, and Pearson’s correlations (n = 117).
M SD SK K Min–max DDFS SRIS-SRa SRIS-IN RRSa Broodinga Reflection BDI-IIa MAAS
DDFS 36.19 8.49 0.04 −0.48 18–58 (0.91) 0.21* −0.21* 0.24** 0.21* 0.17s 0.12 −0.25**
SRIS-SR 51.39 9.91 −0.70 0.00 23–68 (0.94) −0.12 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.55s*** 0.15 0.13
SRIS-IN 31.66 5.9 −0.41 0.02 15–44 (0.82) −0.21* −0.18 −0.06s −0.28** 0.39***
RRS 39.41 10.92 1.01 1.28 22–79 (0.93) 0.88*** 0.73s*** 0.36*** −0.01
Brooding 9.48 3.04 0.84 0.73 5–19 (0.77) 0.56s*** 0.38*** 0.01
Reflection 7.98 2.6 1.14 0.96 5–16 (0.74) 0.13s 0.07s
BDI-II 8.56 6.46 1.41 2.47 0–34 (0.85) −0.25**
MAAS 4.17 0.59 −0.38 0.14 2.53–5.47 (0.81)
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The values between parentheses are Cronbach’s alphas. SK, skewness; K, kurtosis; DDFS, Daydreaming Frequency Scale;
SRIS-SR, Self-reflection scale of the Self-reflection and Insight Scale; SRIS-IN, Insight scale of the Self-reflection and Insight Scale; RRS, Ruminative Response
Scale—total score; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory 2nd Edition; MAAS, Mindful Attention Awareness Scale.
aData transformed to either obtain normally distributed variables or correct for outliers (z point > 3).
sSpearman’s rank correlation coefficient.
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Table 2 | Specific and total indirect effects’ unstandardized
coefficients, standard error, and 95% bias-corrected confidence
intervalsa (n = 117).
Path Indirect effect Boot Boot LL Boot UL
coefficient SE CI 95% CI 95%
a1b1 0.0005 0.0010 −0.0012 0.0029
a2b2 0.0019 0.0015 −0.0006 0.0057
a1a3b2 0.0014 0.0008 0.0004 0.0036
Total indirect effect 0.0037 0.0019 0.0007 0.0082
a1b1, Daydreaming → Self-focus → Depressive symptoms; a2b2, Daydreaming
→ Brooding → Depressive symptoms; a1a3b2, Daydreaming → Self-focus →
Brooding → Depressive symptoms.
aMindfulness score (MAAS) was included as covariate.
So did the other alternative path, whereby daydreaming predicts
depressive symptoms via brooding levels (path a2b2 = 0.0019;
boot 95% CI LL = −0.0006, boot 95% CI UL = 0.0057). In sum,
the three-step indirect effect was the only statistically significant
effect, and, despite that it consisted of two intervening variables,
it was parsimonious too, in that simpler models did not explain
the data satisfactorily (see Figure 3).
We then tested both the total (path c) and the direct (path
c′) effect using the OLS regression approach. Table 3 shows that
both unstandardized coefficients were not significant. We can
thus conclude that the hypothesized serial (indirect) effect model
was supported and that daydreaming seems to explain depres-
sive symptoms only via the contribution of both self-focus and
depressive brooding.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
We also explored two alternative models that were in contrast to
our main hypothesis. We investigated whether the same three-
step indirect effect was statistically significant, after removing
brooding and including reflection as the second intervening vari-
able. Given the unclear link between reflection and depression
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), we expected this model would not
be significant. In keeping with this, Table 4 shows that this alter-
native model was in fact not statistically sound (path a1a3b2 =
0.0005; boot 95% CI LL = −0.0004, boot 95% CI UL = 0.0021).
By capitalizing on the literature (Smallwood et al., 2011), we
also put forward that self-focus could lead to a habitual tendency
to daydream that in turn could explain depressive symptoms via
the contribution of brooding. In contrast, our main hypothe-
sis argued that daydreaming would lead to depressive brooding
only via the self-referential focus of task-free mental activity.
Because of this, we expected that this alternative model would
not reach significance. Table 5 shows indeed that self-focus fails
to explain depressive symptoms via daydreaming and brooding
serially (path a1a3b2 = 0.0028; boot 95% CI LL = −0.0003, boot
95% CI UL = 0.0113).
DISCUSSION
SGT and mental phenomena that are based on it, such
as daydreaming, are increasingly attracting scholars’ attention
(Klinger, 1971, 1990, 2009, 2013; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Ta
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FIGURE 3 | Statistical diagram with path coefficients. (B) Total effect:
c = 0.002. (A) Direct effect: c′ = −0.001. Specific indirect effect of interest:
a1a3b = 0.036(0.149)0.249 ≈ 0.0014. Bold paths are statistically
significant, while dashed paths are not significant.
Table 4 | Specific and total indirect effects’ unstandardized
coefficients, standard errors, and 95% bias-corrected confidence
intervalsa (n = 117).
Path Indirect effect Boot Boot LL Boot UL
coefficient SE CI 95% CI 95%
a1b1 0.0014 0.0013 −0.0005 0.0047
a2b2 0.0004 0.0007 −0.0003 0.0025
a1a3b2 0.0005 0.0006 −0.0004 0.0021
Total indirect effect 0.0022 0.0014 0.0001 0.0056
a1b1, Daydreaming → Self-focus → Depressive symptoms; a2b2, Daydreaming
→ Reflection → Depressive symptoms; a1a3b2, Daydreaming → Self-focus →
Reflection → Depressive symptoms.
aMindfulness score (MAAS) was included as covariate.
Table 5 | Specific and total indirect effects’ unstandardized
coefficients, standard errors, and 95% bias-corrected confidence
intervals (n = 117).
Path Indirect effect Boot Boot LL Boot UL
coefficient SE CI 95% CI 95%
a1b1 0.0025 0.0047 −0.0054 0.0139
a2b2 0.0373 0.0141 0.0143 0.0695
a1a3b2 0.0028 0.0027 −0.0003 0.0113
Total indirect effect 0.0426 0.0151 0.0169 0.0762
a1b1, Self-focus → Daydreaming → Depressive symptoms; a2b2, Self-focus
→ Brooding → Depressive symptoms; a1a3b2, Self-focus → Daydreaming →
Brooding → Depressive symptoms.
Andrews-Hanna et al., in press; Smallwood, 2013) given their
ubiquitous impact on mental life. Interestingly, daydreaming has
been associated with increased depressive symptoms and negative
cognitions (Smallwood et al., 2007; Meyer et al., 2011), although
findings are mixed. Here we sought to examine some of the
pathways that could potentially explain why and how daydream-
ing leads to depressive outcomes and, in turn, account for the
inconsistency reported in the literature.
In our study, we found that levels of daydreaming and depres-
sive symptoms were statistically independent. However, accord-
ing to the previous studies and a recent theoretical framework
(Marchetti et al., 2013, under review), daydreaming did predict
depressive outcomes, but only to the extent to which self-focus
and brooding were involved too. In other words, during SGT, our
attention tends to be focused on internal scenarios related to our
self and self-related goals (Northoff et al., 2006; Klinger, 2009;
Diaz et al., 2013). This enhances the chance of ruminating on
the (lack of) progress in salient goal-striving (Koster et al., 2011;
Klinger, 2013). Unfortunately, such a passive and self-critical eval-
uation has consistently been reported to be depressogenic (Aldao
et al., 2010). It is also noteworthy that, in line with these results,
daydreaming was negatively correlated with both mindfulness
and the clarity of self-knowledge. That is, people who reported
experiencing daydreaming generally did not benefit from being
aware of the presentmoment nor did being self-focused lead them
to a better understanding of themselves.
On the one hand, these findings are important because they
convey a plausible homological model suggesting possible direc-
tional links between crucial constructs in depression, such as
daydreaming, self-focus, and brooding. It is also noteworthy
that the proposed model could bridge the gap between cogni-
tive and neurobiological science, in that the hypothesis tested
in this study is compatible with evidence derived from both
research fields. As mental baseline, daydreaming is considered
the quintessential outcome of the DMN (Mason et al., 2007),
while self-focus has been robustly associated with a specific DMN
subnetwork, Cortical Midline Structures (CMS; Northoff et al.,
2006). Unsurprisingly, both rumination and clinical depressive
status, too, have been linked with higher levels of DMN functional
connectivity during resting state (Greicius et al., 2007; Berman
et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2012). Therefore, the model tested in
this study holds promise for guiding future neuroimaging studies
where trait rumination could be associated with specific dynamics
of neural activation of DMN-related brain regions (i.e., Granger
causality test; Hamilton et al., 2011).
On the other hand, we believe that our study not only repli-
cated previous findings, but also complements these research
lines that may suffer from suboptimal ecological validity. Both
fMRI investigations and experimental studies usually require
individuals to rest in conditions that are far from those usually
experienced. For instance, recent methodological studies high-
light the detrimental impact of the scanner background noise
on the neural activation of DMN and resting state (Gaab et al.,
2008; Hommel et al., 2012; Rondinoni et al., 2013). On the con-
trary, in our study we did not impose any artificial condition, but
we simply investigated stable and long-term dispositions through
self-report. By doing so, we may have been able to track spe-
cific mechanisms that are more likely to mirror what happens
in everyday life, although future experience sampling studies are
warranted.
This study has several limitations that we want to acknowl-
edge. First, the research design is totally self-report based and
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methodologically cross-sectional, so that no cause-effect claims
can be made. Nevertheless, to partially mitigate this flaw, we
ruled out four alternative models. Not only did this support our
hypothesis, but it also confirmed the validity of the model, in that
no redundant variable was detected. Apparently, both self-focus
and maladaptive rumination were necessary components for day-
dreaming to impact on depressive symptoms. However, in order
to be able to further validate the model, behavioral high-risk lon-
gitudinal designs are warranted (Alloy et al., 1999). Second, we
acquired information only about the frequency of daydreaming
and not on its specific content. According to recent perspectives
on SGT (Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013), a factor impli-
cated in the impacting of daydreaming on well-being is its specific
content, either positive vs. negative, or past- vs. future-oriented
(Klinger et al., 2009; Ruby et al., 2013). Accordingly, future studies
should include additional significant variables in order to better
specify under which circumstances daydreaming leads to depres-
sive outcomes and, most importantly, when this is not the case.
Third, according to our hypothesis aiming at clarifying the role of
daydreaming in depression, we did not take into account the pos-
sibly positive effects of SGT. For instance, previous research has
indeed reported that DDFS is positively correlated with creative
thinking (Baird et al., 2012) and neurobiological evidence sug-
gests that SGT could facilitate social cognition (Schilbach et al.,
2008, 2012). So, we cannot exclude that possible positive effects
due to SGT did go unnoticed in our study.
In sum, the clinical importance of resting state and rest-related
phenomena is increasingly being stressed by both researchers and
clinicians (Rosner et al., 2004;Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012),
with different models being proposed (i.e., Marchetti et al., 2012a,
under review; Andrews-Hanna et al., in press). In our study, we
confirmed a plausible mechanism recently proposed by Marchetti
et al. (2013), whereby daydreaming is supposed to impact on
depression via contribution of both self-focus and rumination.
However, we are not claiming here that daydreaming is negative
per se. On the contrary, we have been able to clarify a specific
mechanism where self-focus seems to be pivotal (Green, 1923).
This also implies that, in individuals with a different style, day-
dreaming might have different effects, such as in those who tend
to be more other-focused than purely self-focused during free
thinking (Mar et al., 2012; Marchetti and Koster, 2014).
In conclusion, daydreaming is a very fluid and complex men-
tal activity. Theoretical and empirical efforts are necessary to
highlight both the negative and positive consequences of such a
pervasive phenomenon that occupies a vast part of our mental
life.
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